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SWINGING FOR THE FENCE: A CALL FOR INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM AS DOMINICAN BOYS RISK THEIR FUTURES FOR
A CHANCE IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
DIANA L. SPAGNUOLO*
You drive around and look at local ballfields in this country
and you'll find they are empty.... That's what I love about
going to Latin American countries, places like the Domini-
can Republic. It's like going back in time, the way it was
here in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s. You see kids playing eve-
rywhere, with taped-up balls, taped-up bats, whatever
they've got to do to play. That's why the search for talent is
expanding world-wide.'
1. INTRODUCTION
Baseball reflects the social, economic, and political develop-
ments of its own environment. Like many industries, the business
of American baseball has been directly affected by the globaliza-
tion of the world's economies.2 In the early 1900s, sports entrepre-
neur A.G. Spaulding addressed baseball's involvement in interna-
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Volunteer, Dominican Republic, 1997-1999; A.B. 1996, Bowdoin College. The Au-
thor thanks Lynn Axelroth and Dominic De Simone of Ballard Spahr Andrews &
Ingersoll, LLP; William Webb and Wil Tejada of the Philadelphia Phillies; Lou
Melsndez of Major League Baseball; Tony Bernazard of Major League Baseball's
Players Association; and Jill Concannon of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Economic Law. Quiero agradecer a mi amigo, Angel Mateo, por su
ayuda y apoyo con este proyecto, y a todos en Bani, Rep(iblica Dominicana que
compartieron sus experiencias conmigo.
1 Arturo Marcano & David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Baseball: Major League
Baseball and the Mistreatment of Latin American Baseball Talent, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 511, 530 (1999), in John Harper, The International Pastime, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 27,1997, at 16.
2 More than twenty-five percent of major league players are from Latin
America, and more than half of those are from the Dominican Republic ("D.R.").
MARCOS BRETON & Jost Luis VILLEGAS, AWAY GAMES 36 (1999).
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tional politics when he declared that the sport should "follow the
flag" as the United States sought to flex its political and military
muscle around the world.3 In many ways, baseball did just that; as
a result, the sport has become part of a wide range of diverse cul-
tures.4 In today's global economy, the teams of Major League
Baseball ("MLB") benefit from recruiting efforts in countries
around the world, including Korea, Japan, Spain, Belgium, the
Philippines, Mexico, and Venezuela.5 But nowhere has the farming
of players been as intense as in the small Caribbean nation of the
Dominican Republic ("D.R.").6
In recent years, the presence of Latino, and especially Domini-
can, ballplayers in MLB has exploded. Players like Sammy Sosa
and Vladamir Guerrero 7 broke away from childhood poverty to
make millions through success in MLB. These players are heroes
in their hometowns and entire Dominican communities continue to
benefit from their altruism, made possible by large salaries from
MLB teams.8 But for every Sosa, there are thousands who never
make it, thousands who sacrifice much and gain little. According
to players' advocates, those players become the unfortunate vic-
tims of a system that exploits Dominican boys to serve as a source
of cheap labor for MLB. 9 This Comment explores both the benefits
and the negative effects of MLB's recruitment of Dominican play-
ers and suggests institutional changes to address these problems.
3 ALAN M. KLEIN, SUGARBALL 15 (1991); Donald Roden, Baseball and the Quest
for National Dignity in Meiji Japan, 85 AM. HIST. REv. 511, 534 (1980).
4 Peter Gammons, International Pastime: Tapping Foreign Markets and Talent
Does America's Game a World of Good, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1998, at F2.
5 William B. Gould IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard
and Watched 'Round the World (With Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 86-87 (2000).
6 Many commentators attribute the dominant role of Dominican players over
that of other Latin American countries to a variety of factors, including the inac-
cessibility of Cuban players due to Communism and the Embargo, as well as strict
laws protecting against the exploitation of Mexican players. See, e.g., MICHAEL M.
OLEKSAK & MARY ADAMS OLEKSAK, BIISBOL: LATIN AMERICANS AND THE GRAND OLD
GAME 169 (1991).
7 Luciana Chavez, A World Away: Baseball Player Vladamir Guerrero Travels
Back to Dominican Republic, SPORTING NEwS, Feb. 19, 2001, available at
http://www.findartices.com/cf_0/m1208/8.2/70926949/print.jhtml.
8 SAMUEL 0. REGALADO, VIVA BASEBALL! LATIN MAJOR LEAGUERS AND THEIR
SPECIAL HUNGER 201 (1998).
9 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, Special Assistant to the Execu-
tive Director, Major League Baseball Players Association (Nov. 27, 2002) (tran-
script on file with Author).
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In order to provide a better understanding of how the business
of baseball developed as a focal point in Dominican culture, Sec-
tion 2 of this Comment traces the history of the sport's develop-
ment in the D.R. alongside the nation's political and economic de-
velopment, vis-h-vis American influence and intervention. Section
3 examines the role of the baseball academy and presents argu-
ments from the perspectives of both players' advocates and MLB.
Section 4 analyzes the economic factors that make the current re-
cruiting system possible. Section 5 explores the legal dilemma
Dominican players find themselves in once they are released from
their contracts. Section 6 suggests possible institutional reform in
order to improve the current recruiting system. Section 7 con-
cludes the Comment.
2. THE HISTORY OF BASEBALL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
During the 1860s, American troops developed the game of
baseball in Cuba. In 1891, the Alomar Brothers, two Cubans work-
ing in the D.R., began teaching Dominicans their country's new
pastime.1 0 Between its introduction to the Dominican people in
1891 and the mid-1920s, Dominican baseball developed within
loosely formed leagues with occasional competition among Cuban
and Puerto Rican teams." One of the greatest moments of early
Dominican baseball was the no-hit shutout against an American
Navy team in 1914. This Dominican victory would later become a
source of pride for Dominican nationalists when U.S. Marines in-
vaded their homeland in 1916.12
While the Marine invasion of 1916 was detrimental to Domini-
can autonomy and independence, it did have some positive contri-
butions. The occupation served to develop both Dominican patri-
otism and Dominican baseball, and since that day, the two have
continued to develop hand-in-hand. 13 Fierce competitions began
on the baseball diamond as Dominicans had the opportunity to re-
deem themselves and overcome the degrading presence of Los
10 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 16; JOHN KRICH, EL BIISBOL: TRAVELS THROUGH THE
PAN-AMERICAN PASTIME 119 (1989).
11 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 17.
12 Id.
13 Samuel 0. Regalado, Viva Baseball! The Beginnings of Latin American Base-
ball, reprinted in BASEBALL HISTORY FROM OUTSIDE THE LINES 332 (John E. Dreifort
ed., 2001) [hereinafter Dreifort].
20031
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Yanquis14 on their homeland. The games were seen as symbolic
battles against the Northerners; on the baseball field, Dominicans
could beat the Americans at their own game.15 The years of the oc-
cupation led to growth of the game and of a sense of national
pride.
During the mid-1920s and 1930s, Dominicans saw tremendous
development of the game as leagues became more formalized and
business owners began to provide financial sponsorship to teams.16
However, due to the Dominican economy's strong dependence on
American investors that continues to this day, Dominican indus-
tries, including the business of baseball, reacted to the fluctuations
of the American economy.17 When the Great Depression hit the
United States in 1929, Dominican baseball retracted.18 While de-
velopment did continue on the level of small-scale individual se-
ries, it was greatly reduced from 1929 to 1935 when the National
Championship Series was halted because of economic difficulties.19
The relationship between Dominican players and MLB contin-
ued to grow through the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid-1970s, the
Dominican leagues were recruiting and training players for MLB in
the United States. One of the top scouts at the time, Rafael Avila,
realized a more holistic approach was needed if players were going
to be truly successful in the Major Leagues. Avila tried to convince
14 Long before the New York Yankees became heroes in Dominican culture,
"Los Yanquis" were the unwanted foreigners whose very presence threatened the
vision of nationalists for their country. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 13.
15 ROB RUCK, THE TROPIC OF BASEBALL: BASEBALL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
26-27 (First Bison Books 1999) (1991). See also Dreifort, supra note 13, at 332 (dis-
cussing how baseball became a symbol of resistance against the American occupa-
tion).
16 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 18.
17 See infra Section 4 (discussing how the Dominican economy's dependence
on foreign investment has inhibited independent growth).
18 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 21.
19 Id. During this period, Dominican teams also began to include black play-
ers from the American Negro Leagues-players who were denied access to MLB.
Unlike its American counterpart, Dominican baseball reflected the racial diversity
of its society in general. Opening the Dominican leagues to Black Americans pro-
moted the infiltration of the American pastime into Dominican culture and was an
important step in continuing the relationship between U.S. and Dominican
baseball. See KRICH, supra note 10, at 111 (detailing the relationship between Black
Americans and Dominican baseball); MARK RIBOwSKY, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE
NEGRO LEAGUES 1884 TO 1955, 218-19 (1995) (emphasizing the presence of Black
Americans in MLB as a key factor in the development of this American sport in
the Dominican Republic); RucK, supra note 15, at 33 (comparing American and
Dominican baseball's treatment of race during the 1920s and 1930s).
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his employer, the Los Angeles Dodgers, that the team's recruiting
efforts would benefit from a formalized system where players not
only prepared for the physical aspects of the game, but also
learned what it would take to succeed both emotionally and cul-
turally in the United States.20
After the Dodgers denied Avila's request, Avila independently
developed what is now considered to be the first baseball academy
in the D.R. Avila and his assistant, Elvio Jim(nez, built two dormi-
tories in Jimnez's backyard and paid Jim~nez's wife to prepare the
players' meals.21 Avila successfully removed young players from
their communities and any other influence that might distract them
from their goal of making it to the Major Leagues. By the mid-
1980s the Dodgers took notice and decided to formally invest in a
true baseball academy. After decades of informal farming of Do-
minican players for American MLB, the Dodgers created a formal-
ized institution that would serve as a model for other American
teams in their quest for young talent.22
3. THE BASEBALL ACADEMY
3.1. The Critics' Perspective
The academy is the baseball counterpart of the colonial
outpost, the physical embodiment overseas of the parent
franchise. It operates more or less like the subsidiary of any
foreign company: it finds raw materials (talented athletes),
refines them (trains the athletes), and ships abroad finished
products (baseball players).23
Similar to the Spaniards and then the Americans who used the
D.R. for its sugarcane, and like the foreign investors who continue
to use the country's cheap labor to staff textile factories,24 MLB
20 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 63-64.
21 Id. at 64-65.
22 BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 42-44.
23 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 42.
24 By 1999, forty-three free trade zones housed 400 factories and employed
more than 200,000 people. Similar to the baseball academies, these factories are
foreign-owned, over half by U.S. companies. Critics argue that the factories exist
to promote foreign interests at the expense of the Dominican population; employ-
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found a tremendous opportunity in the talents of young Domini-
can athletes with dreams of breaking free from the cycle of pov-
erty. In pursuing this resource, the teams of MLB built the physical
infrastructures that would serve to process the raw talent before
exporting it to the United States. Just as Spanish colonists carved
into the Dominican countryside to plant sugarcane, and interna-
tional textile companies constructed their factories on land that
once supported local agriculture, the teams of MLB "plowed amid
the island's sugar-cane plantations, replacing its yield stock with
baseball diamonds, batting cages, and pitching mounds-the new
growth industry of Latin America." 25
Critics claim the academies actively perpetuate the cycle of
poverty and poor education in the D.R., while exploiting the coun-
try's difficult economic reality. The major allegations surrounding
the academies include scouts' attempts to hide talent from other
teams26 and abuses of the Seventeen-Year-Old Rule27 that include
lying and falsifying players' documents.
ees in the sweatshops work long hours and earn only U.S. $80 to $120 per month.
Marie Michael, The Dominican Republic: Latin America's Latest Economic "Miracle"?,
DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 35. While the opportunity to bring in a salary,
albeit minimal, is arguably a slight improvement to many families' financial situa-
tions, the negative effects of the sweatshops outweigh their benefits. Players' ad-
vocates claim the same is true with baseball. Like young baseball players, teenag-
ers leave school to seek employment in the factories, thereby severely limiting any
prospect of upward mobility in Dominican society. See Latin America Financial
Publications, Inc., The Dominican Republic: Outstanding Economic Results, LATIN
FIN., Nov. 1, 2001, at S18 [hereinafter Financial Publications] (proposing that Do-
minican educational standards are not high enough to attract better foreign in-
vestment).
25 BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 42.
26 Ross Newhan & Paul Gutierrez, Island Fever; Dominican Republic: Beltr6 Case
Wouldn't Be First Violation of Rules in this Baseball-Mad and Talent-Rich Country, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at D1.
27 The rule provides that a player who is not subject to the draft and
who is not under contract with a Major League Baseball team can be
signed by any team if '(1) he is seventeen years old at the time of signing,
or (2) he is sixteen years old at the time of signing and he will turn seven-
teen prior to the later of (i) the conclusion of the baseball season in which
he signed and (ii) September 1 of the year he signs.'
Major League Baseball Rule 3(a)(1)(B) [hereinafter Major League Rule], quoted in
Angel Vargas, The Globalization of Baseball: A Latin American Perspective, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 21, 26 (2000). See also OLEKSAK & OLEKSAK, supra note 6, at
184 (describing a type of recruiting involving an anti-abuse rule that is more nur-
turing for the boys).
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3.1.1. Hidden Talent
Angel Vargas, General Secretary of the Caribbean Baseball
Players Confederation, claims the academies provide MLB with the
opportunity to hoard players and hide them from other scouts.28
Because teams are limited in the number of U.S. visas granted an-
nually, the teams gather the players in the academies,29 keeping
them from other teams that might have available visas and might
provide the players an opportunity to advance within the system.30
The academies thus remove the players from the market, poten-
tially creating situations where the players never sign a contract to
play baseball in the United States. Vargas claims it is better for the
teams to have players remain in their own academies than on the
roster of a potential opponent. But according to players' advo-
cates, this attitude hurts the young players whose talent becomes
trapped inside the walls of the academy.
Critics claim that scouts in the D.R. often attempt to penetrate
the walls of the academies and steal players from other teams be-
cause, until the players actually sign a contract, they are technically
still available.31 Former Dominican Commissioner of Baseball Papi
Bisono recounts stories of worried parents reporting the disap-
pearance of their sons. "She'd heard that her son had been taken
away by a baseball scout... . The scouts who ran them kept the
kids hidden: That is the real truth. These camps were hideouts be-
cause the scouts didn't want their kids seen by other Scouts." 32
3.1.2. Underage Players
Players' advocates argue that teams also use the academies to
circumvent the Seventeen-Year-Old Rule that places a minimum
28 See Newhan & Gutierrez, supra note 26, at D1 (explaining that academies
can keep players under contract in an academy for up to three years).
29 See Telephone Interview with Lou Melsndez, Vice-President of Latin
American Operations, Major League Baseball (Nov. 2, 2002) (explaining how visas
limit the number of Dominican players that MLB can send to the United States)
(transcript on file with Author).
30 Vargas, supra note 27, at 28-29.
31 In the United States, scouts may only pursue players until they have been
drafted. In contrast, Dominican players can be recruited up until the moment
they sign a contract. BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 46. But see infra Section
3.2.2. (discussing the buscones and the academy's one-month limitation on keeping
unsigned players).
32 BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 47.
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age limit on exactly whom may be signed.33 Many allege that not
all players at the academies are actually signed,34 and that boys be-
tween the ages of twelve and sixteen often attend the camps.35 As
Vargas contends, young boys are thrown into the mix and are ex-
pected to participate in the curriculum designed for young men
who are at least seventeen years of age - a practice that can be
physically and emotionally damaging to these children.36
Much controversy surrounds the ages of Dominican players.
In 1999, MLB fined the Los Angeles Dodgers when MLB discov-
ered that the team had signed Adrian Beltr6 when he was only fif-
teen years old. In 1994, Dodger employees at the Las Palmas
Academy in the D.R. falsified Beltr6's documents in order to obtain
certification that the player was within the parameters of the Sev-
enteen-Year-Old Rule.37 According to MLB Commissioner Bud
Selig, Beltr6 participated in the scheme in order to land a contract
and to avoid having to wait another year. While Selig fined the
Dodgers $50,000 and closed the team's Dominican training camp
for one year,38 it seems that many other such violations go unpun-
ished in what critics and defenders alike consider "routine prac-
tice" for MLB scouts in the D.R.39 Dodgers senior vice-president
and former manager Tommy Lasorda defended the Dodgers' ac-
tions by claiming that they did nothing out of the ordinary. As
Lasorda stated, "I'll bet you there's [sic] fifty ballplayers in the ma-
jor leagues that have signed illegally."40
33 Vargas, supra note 27, at 26; see also OLEKSAK & OLEKSAK, supra note 6, at 184
("In 1984, the major leagues... created a 17 year-old age limit on the signing of
young [players].").
34 See Newhan & Gutierrez, supra note 26, at D12 (discussing the abuses of the
competitive system of signing and drafting young Dominicans and the fact that
there are no guarantees of success in MLB).
35 Vargas, supra note 27, at 29.
36 Id.
37 Associated Press, Dodgers Fined for Signing Young Beltri (Dec. 21, 1999)
[hereinafter Young Beltre], available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/1999/1221
/246027.html; Vargas, supra note 27, at 26.
38 In addition to the fines and closing of the Dodgers' academy, Commis-
sioner Selig imposed sanctions against retired scout Rafael Avila, the same man
credited with opening the first-ever baseball academy in the D.R. See Young Beltri,
supra note 37 (stating that Avila, the semi-retired vice president of Campo Las
Palmas, was ordered to serve a one-year suspension from baseball).
39 RIBOWSKY, supra note 19, at 208.
40 Associated Press, Lasorda Defends Dodgers' Actions (Dec. 16, 1999) [hereinaf-
ter Lasorda Defends], available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/1999/1116
/174860.html.
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For critics, Lasorda's admission that the Dodgers' signing of
Beltr6 was nothing out of the ordinary simply reinforces the belief
that MLB scouts disregard regulations intended to protect mi-
nors.41 The Beltr6 scenario also indicates MLB's failure to success-
fully regulate its overseas recruiting42 and emphasizes a need for
further cooperation between MLB and the Dominican Commis-
sioner of Amateur Baseball, as discussed in Section 6 of this Com-
ment.
3.1.3. The "Boatload Mentality"43
MLB's approach to recruiting players in the D.R. is to cast a
wide net by signing as many players as possible and holding as
many others inside the academies. In the United States, the market
itself would regulate such behavior because signing more players
than could ever be employed, even in the minor leagues, would be
prohibitively expensive. 44 In contrast, teams can sign Dominican
players for a fraction of the cost.45 As some scouts readily admit,
the teams prefer to sign twenty Dominicans at $5,000 apiece, rather
than only two Americans at $50,000 each.46
Critics argue that this unabashed behavior by scouts only
proves their point: MLB sees these players as commodities and
fails to recognize the long-term negative implications that some of
their actions might have on the players' lives. Players' advocate
Tony Bernazard identifies this mentality as the source of the ineq-
uities facing Dominican recruits.47 According to Bernazard, "Base-
41 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9.
42 Gammons, supra note 4, at F2.
43 See BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 38 (citing Colorado Rockies Vice
President Dick Balderson's admission that MLB benefits from the "boatload men-
tality-).
44 Without the Dominican academies, this "boatload mentality" would also
be confined by U.S. State Department regulations that limit new visas for minor
league players to approximately twenty per team. Telephone Interview with Lou
Mel~ndez, supra note 29 (discussing governmental allocations of H2B Visas for
minor league players).
45 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9 ("They don't have
to bring all of those guys over here. They don't have to use all this space for train-
ing. Let's filter these guys out and we don't have to use all these visas. Major
League Baseball saves money with these academies.").
46 See BRErON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 38 (theorizing that big league teams
gain more by signing large numbers of players for very little money, so that if
some players make it to MLB, teams still make a profit).
47 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9.
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ball is a business. Baseball cares about, like any other industry,
getting the products for less money and developing the products in
the cheapest way possible. That is how this Dominican situation
has evolved." 48
3.2. Defending the Academies
The Author found that no one in MLB denies that the afore-
mentioned violations exist,49 but while it is easy to blame MLB for
the problems, the situation is far more complicated than it initially
appears. The business of baseball does not operate in a vacuum.
Like all industries, baseball must contend with the social, political,
and economic factors within its environment.
3.2.1. The Benefits
3.2.1.1. Player Benefits
Most of these guys have never had three meals [a day] in
their lives and every organization is giving them a chance
and an opportunity to be somebody in life. 50
According to MLB and the teams that run the baseball acad-
emies, these training centers offer Dominican boys an opportunity
to fully develop their talents and reach their athletic potential. The
academies take a holistic approach to a player's physical and emo-
tional development. The academies teach more than baseball:
They prepare the boys for a new culture and language, so they can
compete with their American counterparts.51
In addition to housing the boys and training them in the fun-
damentals of baseball, the academies provide medical and dental
care, laundry services,5 2 and a regimented diet, as directed by a nu-
48 Id.
49 Telephone Interview with Lou Meldndez, supra note 29 (recognizing the
violations and explaining MLB's plans to address them).
5o Interview with Wil Tejada, Head Scout, Philadelphia Phillies Baseball
Academy, in Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep. (Aug. 13, 2002) (transcript on file with
Author).
51 Id.
52 REGALADO, supra note 8, at 201-02 (citing Dave Nightingale, Baseball's Secret
Treasure, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 19, 1985). The newer facilities also have small
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tritionist from the Dominican Commissioner's Office in Santo Do-
mingo.53 On a typical day, players rise at 7:30 a.m., eat breakfast
prepared by hired cooks, and spend their mornings competing or
practicing. The morning session is followed by lunch and English
lessons. Most academies hire a private English instructor to work
with the players and prepare them for not only communicating
with their future (mostly English-speaking) teammates, but for
everyday life in the United States. 54 In the late afternoon, players
return to the field for more individualized instruction, followed by
dinner and free time in the evenings.55
3.2.1.2. Benefits for the Families
Aside from the services and support the academies provide,
academy advocates stress the economic benefits that come from the
players' relationships with the academies. The founder of the
academies, Rafael Avila, stresses that for many families, the acad-
emies represent an opportunity to reduce the number of mouths
that need to be fed at home.56 In addition, players almost always
use their earnings to support family members. Players in their first
year at an academy earn $600 U.S. per month. Second-year players
earn $700 and those in their third year earn $750 per month.57 The
most common alternative form of employment available to non-
high school graduates would be a position in one of the country's
many garment factories, typically earning a mere $100 per month.58
The academies give the MLB teams an opportunity to provide em-
ployment (albeit, often temporary) for these young players with
incomes that far exceed most employment alternatives. As a result,
these boys are better able to help support their own families. 59
gyms, a training room to treat injuries, and a recreation area for the players' free
time. Interview with Wil Tejada, supra note 50.
53 Interview with Wil Tejada, supra note 50.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 REGALADO, supra note 8, at 201-02.
57 Interview with Wil Tejada, supra note 50.
58 See Telephone Interview with "Yenny," former employee in a Dominican
garment factory (Dec. 18, 2002) (discussing her compensation as a worker in the
Zona Franca (Free Trade Zone)) (interview notes on file with Author).
59 Rick Morrissey, Doctoring Age Good Medicine in the Dominican, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 2, 2001, at 1C.
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3.2.1.3. Benefits for the Communities
Communities that host the academies also benefit from MLB's
presence. In addition to the actual players, academies employ
cooks, housekeepers, medical trainers, English teachers, security
guards, groundskeepers, scouts, and a team of coaches.60 Beyond
providing direct employment, academies create indirect job oppor-
tunities for other members of their host communities.6' Local en-
trepreneurs sell homemade goods as refreshments at the games
that are usually well attended by locals. Additionally, motor-taxis,
a common sight on street corners in the D.R., benefit from trans-
porting fans to and from the games, and players between the acad-
emies and nearby towns. Overall, an academy's presence helps to
create jobs and stimulate economic activity in its host community. 62
3.2.2. Hidden Talent: Buscones and MLB's Legal Black Hole
Due to current regulations on the length of time a team may
retain an unsigned player, it seems unlikely that the formal acad-
emies serve to hide talented players who have not signed formal
contracts. However, the problem does exist and unregulated 63
scouts, or buscones, are at least partially to blame.64 Buscones are
scouts who canvas the Dominican countryside in search of young
talent and notify MLB scouts when they believe they have discov-
ered noteworthy players.65 If the MLB scout signs the player, the
busc6n almost always receives a portion of the player's signing bo-
nus for his role in initiating the relationship between the two par-
60 Interview with Wil Tejada, supra note 50.
61 Id.
62 See Interview with Wilson Pefia, Executive Officer SOELLA, in El Llano,
Bani, Dom. Rep. (Aug. 1999) (describing the benefits the village of El Llano re-
ceived from the presence of the San Diego Padres) (interview notes on file with
Author).
63 Buscones are not regulated by either MLB or the Dominican Commissioner
of Baseball. In addition, MLB and players' advocates describe buscones as a well-
organized and powerful group that successfully lobbies for its own interests with
the Dominican Commissioner. Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra
note 9 (claiming that the Dominican Commissioner is "on the take" from the bus-
cones); Telephone Interview with Lou Meldndez, supra note 29 (describing the bus-
cones as well-organized).
64 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9 (criticizing the role
of the buscones).
65 Interview with Wil Tejada, supra note 50.
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ties. That amount is negotiated between the player and the busc6n,
and MLB denies being involved in that process.66
Part of the dilemma is that families may not be able to distin-
guish scouts employed by MLB from unregulated buscones. As a
result, complaints directed at MLB might actually be the result of
buscones' actions. For example, critics argue that young talent is
hidden within the walls of the academies as MLB teams try to cir-
cumvent the Seventeen-Year-Old Rule.67 This rule states that MLB
may not sign players until they are within six months of their sev-
enteenth birthday;68 academies are accused of housing these un-
signed players for years, until they may sign an MLB contract.
However, MLB's Commissioner's Office limits an unsigned
player's academy stay to one month.69 After that month, the player
must be signed or leave the academy. 70 In contrast, buscones are
free to follow their own rules, untouched by both MLB and the
Dominican Commissioner of Baseball.7' MLB acknowledges the
existence of the unregulated academies, but clearly distinguishes
MLB's academies from those of the buscones.
The buscones have them in their camp as early as twelve or
thirteen from what I hear, not that I have ever seen it, but
those are the things you hear .... We have nothing to do
with those camps. We have our academies and we have
regulations that apply to our academies.72
Addressing the buscones problem is one of the challenges currently
facing MLB, and is discussed in Section 6 of this Comment.
66 Id. He describes the MLB's position on negotiations with buscones and
players, explaining:
That is between the buscones and the players. We comply with the
money we think the players are worth at a particular time. We don't get
involved with what the buscones are going to get or what the family is go-
ing to get. We just tell the family, "Okay, your son is worth this much
and it is your problem to make a deal with the buscones."
67 Vargas, supra note 27, at 29.
68 Interview with Wil Tejada, supra note 50.
69 Telephone Interview with Lou Melndez, supra note 29.
70 Interview with Wil Tejada, supra note 50.
7 Telephone Interview with Lou Mel~ndez, supra note 29.
72 Id.
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3.2.3. Underage Players: Formal Requirements in an Informal
Society
While it is true that MLB scouts aim to recruit young players in
order to take advantage of boys' talents as soon as they are old
enough to sign, it should also be noted that many players also
work the age variable to their own advantage. For example, Oak-
land Athletics shortstop Miguel Tejada claims to have been born in
1976.73 However, in a 1999 interview with men from Tejada's
community, many of whom had grown up playing baseball with
Tejada, the young men insisted that Tejada must have been born in
1974, or even earlier. 74 As many Dominicans explain, scouts lose
interest in players as they age into their twenties. Players com-
monly lie about their dates of birth, appearing younger in order to
land a contract. According to the residents of Tejada's community,
most Dominican players in MLB are at least a few years older than
what they publicly admit.75
This phenomenon is not new to the world of baseball,76 but it
gained mainstream international attention in 2001, when Domini-
can-born Little Leaguer Danny Almonte was criticized for alleg-
edly being older than the thirteen-year old age limit for participa-
tion in the Little League World Series. 77 The event promoted
public discourse about problems that many scouts have faced for
decades-the impossibility of verifying birth dates in a country
where record keeping is often informal. This Comment does not
suggest that players born without proper documentation should be
prohibited from signing a professional contract, as that would se-
verely disadvantage much of the Dominican population. Rather,
73 BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 21.
74 Interview with Florencio Lebr6n, Former teammate of Miguel Tejada, in El
Llano, Banf, Dom. Rep. (Aug. 1999) (transcript on file with Author).
75 Id.
76 New York Yankees pitcher Orlando Hernindez of Cuba claimed he was
four years younger than what his legal documentation eventually revealed. See
Lasorda Defends, supra note 40 (reporting Dodgers Senior Vice President Lasorda's
angry reaction to the possibility of losing his third baseman as a result of viola-
tions of age restrictions).
77 Paulino Perez, Madre de Danny defiende edad de su hijo, LISTIN DIARIO, Aug.
26, 2001 (on file with the U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L.).
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as discussed in Section 6, educational reform might help to address
this dilemma.
4. THE ECONOMICS OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
The Dominican Republic has often been described as a
country that is not completely in control of its destiny.
Outside agents and outside forces, particularly from the
United States, are viewed as having an inordinately large
influence on the political, economic, and cultural life of the
country. 78
Economic developments in American baseball and the D.R.'s
long tradition of dependency on foreign economic influences have
created the current system of recruitment in the D.R. Although
American baseball has had its eye on the country since the start of
the twentieth century, the proliferation of academies, scouts, and
an increase in the general awareness of the benefits the country
had to offer the business of baseball occurred, in part, because of
the implementation of free agency in American baseball. The deci-
sion in the Messersmith and McNally Grievances 79 paved the way
for free agency in baseball,80 and as a result,8 ' the median player's
salary increased from $40,000 in 1976 to $400,000 in 1997.82 Since it
became less financially desirable to recruit American players, a
heightened awareness of the opportunities in a cheap labor market
like the D.R. developed.
On the Dominican front, a long history of foreign economic in-
fluences83 created an underlying acceptance of the presence of yet
78 MICHAEL J. KRYZANEK & HOWARD J. WIARDA, THE POLITICS OF EXTERNAL
INFLUENCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 117(1988).
79 Messersmith, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.); David A.
McNally, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.).
80 ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 128 (1998).
81 Free agency was not the only factor that increased players' salaries. Televi-
sion contracts, fan attendance, merchandising, and league expansion have all con-
tributed to the financial boom in baseball. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS,
SPORTS AND THE LAW 239 (2nd ed. 1998).
82 Id. at 271.
83 See supra Section 2 (describing the history of foreign influence and baseball
in the D.R.).
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another foreign corporation.84 According to Tony Bernazard, Spe-
cial Assistant to the Executive Director of the MLB Players Associa-
tion, foreigners who do business in the D.R. feel that the poverty
they encounter allows them to make decisions on behalf of the
Dominican people. As Bernazard says, "[a] bunch of gringos go to
the Dominican. The conditions are atrocious, and [Dominican]
people [are] begging and asking for things in little barrios with
nothing in them. They [the gringos] think they can do whatever
they want in those places." 85
4.1. A Lack of Bargaining Power
The Dominican economy has created a cycle of interdepen-
dency with foreign influences. On a national scale, the country has
not fully succeeded in generating its own economic activity and
has become increasingly dependent on outside investments. Out-
side investments perpetuate this dependency by preventing the
Dominican economy from developing its own activity. A prime
example of this dependency is the fact that remittances from family
members in the United States are one of the largest contributors to
the Dominican economy.86
At the individual level, the cycle of dependency creates an al-
most desperate willingness to accept what one can get. Few will
dispute the great discrepancy between Dominican and American
signing bonuses.87 Minimal bonuses perpetuate the "boatload
mentality." American-born Alex Rodriguez, now the highest-paid
84 By the late 1980s, there were over 160 American-owned companies and
over eighty private international organizations in the D.R. KRYZANEK & WIARDA,
supra note 78, at 118. Foreign economic presence in a country is certainly not per
se detrimental to a national economy, but there is a limit. Just as foreign-owned
textile industries prevent Dominicans from developing and benefiting from this
business themselves, foreign recruiting efforts serve to undermine the develop-
ment of Dominican baseball leagues. As long as American baseball is every Do-
minican boy's dream, his own country's teams can only be considered second-
best. See Bill Brubaker, Hey, Kid, Wanna Be a Star?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 13,
1981, at 64 (explaining how the presence of U.S. baseball has harmed the devel-
opment of Dominican baseball).
85 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9.
86 Financial Publications, supra note 24, at S18.
87 The average signing bonus for American players is $50,000. See Nicholas
Dawidoff, The Dominican National Pastime, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 30, 1999, at
7. In contrast, Dominican players most commonly sign for less than $5,000. RUCK,
supra note 15, at 201.
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player in MLB, 88 recognizes that if his Dominican parents had not
immigrated to the United States before his birth, he would not
have had the bargaining leverage to demand $1.3 million for his
first major league contract.89
I'm really grateful I was born and raised in the U.S.... I'm
sure I would have been a top prospect, [if he had been born
in the D.R.], but maybe I would have gotten $5,000 or
$10,000. Or maybe $4,000 .... The point is, it would have
been a much tougher road .... You have to pay for tal-
ent .... You should not treat someone unfairly because
they don't have the leverage some of these high-school kids
have here. Just because they don't have the opportunity to
go to Stanford or the University of Miami.90
When a scout offers a Dominican player a $3,000 signing bo-
nus, the player is generally happy to accept it, despite the fact that
his counterpart in the United States might easily demand twenty
times that amount. In a country where, over the past decade, the
annual per capita income has been lower than $1,00091 and the un-
employment rate has ranged from fifteen 92 to thirty percent,93
young players are hardly in a powerful position to negotiate em-
ployment contracts.94 Whether the player is signed with an acad-
emy and earning $800 per month,95 or the player is unsigned and
88 The Texas Rangers paid Rodriguez $21 million for the 2002 season alone.
ESPN, Scouting Report-Alex Rodriguez [hereinafter ESPN], at http://sports
.espn.go.com/mlb/players/profile?statsId=5275.
89 BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 39.
90 Id.
91 Newhan & Gutierrez, supra note 26, at D1.
92 CENTRAL INTELLIGENcE AGENCY, THE WORLD FAcrBOOK 2002-DOMINICAN
REPUBLIc 7 [hereinafter WORLD FAcrol], at http://www.odci.gov/cia
/publications/factbook/geos/dr.html.
93 TIME, ALMANAC 2000 207 (Borgna Brunner ed., 1999).
94 The Dominican Economy is known for its tremendous income inequality.
As a result, relevant per capita income and unemployment figures affecting typi-
cal baseball recruits and their families would demonstrate lower incomes and
higher unemployment, because these families are among the poorest Dominicans.
WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 92, at 6. See also Interview with Wil Tejada, supra
note 50 (explaining that most recruits come from poor families and have very little
formal education).
95 Newhan & Gutierrez, supra note 26, at D1.
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receiving food and housing from a busc6n, one can make the argu-
ment that, statistically speaking, he is financially better off than he
would have been without the influence of American baseball.
Proponents of MLB's recruiting efforts in the D.R. defend the
system by insisting that American baseball is giving the boys a
chance to earn money-an opportunity otherwise scarce in the
country. 96 Boys who sign with the academies often provide their
entire families with much-needed financial assistance. While these
players admittedly earn less than their American counterparts,
they are still better off financially than they would be without the
recruiting efforts of MLB. 97 According to scout Wil Tejada, Do-
minican parents "do not have the money or the luxury to send
their kids to school. So if [the players] have an opportunity to
bring their families food and be successful in life, and besides that
give the family the opportunity to have a lot of money, they will
play baseball." 98
4.2. Foregoing Education
Regarding accusations that scouts entice young boys to leave
school and join the academies, some proponents of MLB argue that
statistics show that most of the boys would not have graduated
from high school anyway. "Baseball doesn't induce anyone to
leave school. These guys aren't going to finish school anyway....
The idea that they finish school is a lot of bull."99 However, the
high school attendance rate among Dominican boys 00 is not a real-
istic indicator that boys would drop out of school, even without the
influence of Major League recruiting. Baseball's influence is eve-
rywhere, underlying nearly every decision that young boys make,
because these boys believe they have a chance of making it big.
Regardless of whether the boy is ever contacted by a scout, the fact
remains that he has an opportunity to at least be recruited into an
academy at a young age. As long as that option exists, MLB will
continue to be a significant influence that deters Dominican boys
from graduating from high school.
% See TIME, supra note 93, at 207 (stating the Dominican unemployment rate
as thirty percent).
97 Brubaker, supra note 84, at 73.
98 Interview with Wit Tejada, supra note 50.
99 Brubaker, supra note 84, at 73.
100 School attendance among Dominican boys ages twelve to seventeen is
only fifty-six percent. Id. at 68.
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* Not everyone in MLB denies the fact that baseball competes
with a Dominican boy's educational opportunities. 101 As discussed
in Section 6, MLB has identified the problem and is currently ex-
ploring options for implementing an educational component to
their recruiting systems in the D.R. and Venezuela.102
5. POST-RELEASE LEGAL DILEMMAS: THE UNDOCUMENTED
UNDERGROUND OF MLB
And no one knows for certain how many 'illegals' major
league baseball is generating every year. But they are out
there and baseball knows it.103
The story of Jos6 Brea'04 illustrates one of the negative, long-
term effects of MLB's recruiting efforts. By age seventeen, Jos6 had
signed with one of the academies in the D.R. and at the time of his
first interview with the Author, Jos6 had just completed his first
season in the U.S minor leagues. 105 Halfway through his second
season, Jose was released from his contract and put on a plane back
to the D.R. But Jose's visa was valid for another two months, so af-
ter a brief visit with his family, Jos6 boarded a plane back to the
United States to begin his new life as an undocumented immigrant.
In his most recent interview with the Author, Jose explained that
he was now earning a living as a dishwasher at a Boston-area res-
taurant. 06
Jos6's story is not at all uncommon, but no one knows for sure
how many undocumented immigrants have entered the United
States as a result of MLB's recruiting efforts in the D.R. (and
around the world). The number of such people remains a mystery;
101 Telephone Interview with Lou Mel(ndez, supra note 29 (stating that "We
[MLB] are aware of the problem with kids leaving school in the Dominican Re-
public to go learn and hopefully become baseball players. We are also aware of
the fact that once they get released from the academy that they don't go back to
school.").
102 Id.
103 BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 192.
104 The Author changed the player's name in order to protect his identity.
Interview with Jos6 Brea, Former Minor League player, in El Llano, Bani, Dom.
Rep. (1998) (interview notes on file with Author).
105 Id,
106 Id.
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like most undocumented aliens, they are unlikely to complete a
census form, and thus remain unaccounted for.107
Only three percent of Dominican players who sign professional
contracts will actually make it to the Major Leagues.1°8 For the
Dominicans who are sent home, the problem is compounded by
the fact that they have no education to direct them into a new ca-
reer, because they sacrificed that education for the chance of a life
in baseball.' 09 Many players are illiterate in their own language"10
and the best employment they can hope for in the D.R. is a position
in one of the foreign-owned garment factories."' With the pros-
pect of Third World poverty in their futures, players choose the
lesser of two evils and opt for lives as undocumented members of
American society.112
6. POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
MLB partially acknowledges the truth behind critics' views on
the current recruiting system in the D.R. and the League expresses
an interest in taking steps to remedy some of those negative effects.
This Section of the Comment examines a number of MLB's most
viable options for improving the influence of its recruiting system.
6.1. A World-wide Draft
MLB has discussed the option of an international draft for
years.113 In the most recent collective bargaining agreement be-
107 BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 192.
108 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 72. See also Brubaker, supra note 84, at 190 (noting
that the odds are overwhelming that none of these players will make it to the ma-
jors, especially when considering that ninety percent of all minor-league players
are released before reaching the majors).
109 See Brubaker, supra note 84, at 73 (explaining that these players are sent
home to an overburdened job market without diplomas or career training).
110 Interview with Elvis Femndez, English Instructor, Philadelphia Phillies
Baseball Academy, in Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep. (Aug. 13, 2002) (describing illit-
eracy in Spanish as one of the biggest challenges in teaching players the funda-
mentals of English) (interview notes on file with Author).
1 See Larry Rohter, Dominican Sex Scandal Mars Big League Dreams, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at Al (noting that a failure to make it in the big leagues will
most likely result in a lifetime of menial labor).
112 See Telephone Interview with Lou Melindez, supra note 29 (admitting that
players commonly remain in the United States upon their release).
113 See Newhan & Gutierrez, supra note 26, at D1 (discussing the benefits of
an international draft in an article from 1999). See also Steve Henson, Labor Daze:
Talk is of Contraction, Revenue-Sharing and Luxury Tax, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at
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tween MLB and the Players Association, both parties agreed to
form a study committee with the goal of moving forward with an
international draft.114 Initially, the committee was to be formed by
October 15, 2002, but both parties are now hoping to finalize the
committee's membership by Opening Day 2003. Among the issues
the committees will face are whether to incorporate extra-national
players into the current draft for domestic players, or to create a
separate draft for international players; the number of rounds in
the draft; how players will register to participate in the draft; and
how to compensate a club that does not sign a player they select in
the first round. In addressing the draft-related issues that both
sides identified in recent negotiations, MLB has a great opportu-
nity to remedy the negative effects of their current recruiting sys-
tem by instituting formal procedures and guidelines as prerequi-
sites for teams to participate in the draft.115 In theory, organizing
the recruiting efforts of all of the teams into one system would help
enforce minimum standards that would apply to every recruiting
relationship. Representatives of MLB also see the international
draft as an opportunity to equalize recruiting opportunities be-
tween large- and small- revenue-generating teams. Closing the fi-
nancial disparity among teams would also serve to promote uni-
formity in the system. Overall, one system could help resolve any
inconsistencies that result from each team having its own proc-
ess.
116
D5 (discussing the idea of implementing an international draft to reduce player
salaries); Bart Hubbuch, Hidden Talents: It's Still Tough for Latin Players to Stand
Out, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, at C1 (quoting Luis Mayoral, a broadcaster and
scout in Latin America, as saying that "'[blaseball is going to have an international
draft before too long.'").
114 See Telephone Interview with Lou MeIndez, supra note 29 (discussing the
current status of negotiations on an international draft).
115 Players' advocates are also quick to emphasize the disadvantages of a
draft system. One such complaint is that drafts are inherently anticompetitive be-
cause they prevent competition among teams for an individual player. Criticism
directed at having a draft in the D.R. includes a fear that a general lack of organi-
zation would cause players to fall through the cracks of the system, because they
would fail to understand how to register for the draft. Others compare the Do-
minican situation to the Puerto Rican situation, where, ever since Puerto Rican
players entered into MLB's draft, fewer Puerto Rican players have obtained pro-
fessional contracts. MLB only appears to want Puerto Rican players if they can be
signed at bargain prices. See Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra
note 9 (discussing his personal complaints about drafts and specifying that Puerto
Ricans have suffered since they began participating in MLB's draft).
116 Telephone Interview with Lou Mel~ndez, supra note 29. But see Interview
with Wil Tejada, supra note 50 (discussing the fact that the Expos, one of MLB's
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6.2. Age Requirements and Educational Components
During recent negotiations between MLB and the Players As-
sociation, both sides established a list of ancillary issues for the
draft committee to address. Among those issues is the age at
which a player can be drafted. 117 This is an opportunity for MLB to
address allegations that their recruiting system exploits minors and
entices young players to leave school.118
In the United States, players cannot leave high school to sign a
baseball contract." 9 In instituting a draft in the D.R., MLB could
require that students be high school graduates or nineteen years of
age. These requirements would create an incentive for boys to stay
in school. They would also promote the development of high
school baseball teams. Currently, high school aged boys are either
in school or playing baseball at one of the academies.120 It is an ei-
ther-or situation; however, MLB could shift that competition to col-
laboration by working with high schools, not against them.
Another pressing issue before the committee is what to do with
the academies if a draft were implemented.121 Again, MLB is pre-
sented with an opportunity to address one of the most criticized
aspects of their current recruiting program. These academies could
work with the Dominican Secretary of Education to incorporate an
educational component, whereby players could complete their
high school education while competing for a chance to play baseball
in the United States. Such a system could be modeled after the
Puerto Rico Baseball Academy and High School, currently in op-
eration in conjunction with the University of Coamo, where stu-
dents play baseball in the morning and attend classes in the after-
noon.12
smallest revenue-generating teams, is regarded as one of the most successful re-
cruiters in the D.R.).
117 See Telephone Interview with Lou Mel~ndez, supra note 29 (reading from
the memorandum detailing the committee's agenda).
118 Instituting an educational requirement for signing Dominican players is
not dependent on a formal draft, but the current negotiations and the creation of
the study committee present an ideal opportunity to address criticism in this area.
119 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9.
120 See Telephone Interview with Lou Mel~ndez, supra note 29 (discussing the
development of players who reside in countries that do not play organized high
school baseball).
121 Id.
122 Id.
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Educating Dominican players would serve to address the ma-
jority of concerns surrounding the current recruiting system. In
addition to ending MLB's role in influencing boys to leave school,
educating players would reduce the number of undocumented ex-
recruits that remain in the United States. With a high school edu-
cation, players would have greater employment opportunities in
their own country and would be less likely to remain in the United
States illegally. MLB cannot continue to ignore the population of
undocumented ex-players it is creating.123 The league should rec-
ognize its role in creating these underground communities and
sponsor efforts to provide these players with the skills they need in
order to openly participate in society. Just as the baseball acad-
emies train players for their transition to the United States, MLB
could provide ongoing education for players that would not only
ease their transition back into Dominican culture, but prepare them
for vocational prospects once they return. 24 This type of education
would be invaluable for both the players and their country; "[i]f
this group of players had education, the problem would not be as
severe .... With education, you can change a country."'2 5
6.3. Cutting Off the Buscones
While MLB teams do not pay buscones a percentage of the
player's signing bonus, the League often pays finders fees to the
buscones. According to MLB, this is one of the practices that the
League is currently in the process of ending, so as to further dis-
tance themselves from the buscones' misconduct. 126 According to
MLB, it is Jos6 Daniel Calzada, Commissioner of Amateur Baseball
in the D.R., who must address the buscones" violations, because the
League has no legal authority to regulate non-American organiza-
tions within the D.R.127
MLB also recognizes that the buscones' strength as a lobbying
group complicates the issue of restricting their role in the recruit-
123 See BRETON & VILLEGAS, supra note 2, at 192 (arguing that MLB's recruit-
ment methods are a source of illegal immigrants).
124 See Telephone Interview with Lou Mel~ndez, supra note 29 (stating that
MLB is considering programs that would provide ongoing educational opportuni-
ties for its Dominican recruits).
125 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9.
126 Telephone Interview with Lou Mel~ndez, supra note 29.
127 Id. ("The thing is under the law we [MLB] cannot come into the D.R. and
try to regulate buscones. We just don't have the jurisdiction. That has to be done
by someone in the country.").
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ing process.128 While MLB officially states that they have a positive
working relationship with the Dominican Commissioner, not all
accounts have been so flattering. Tony Bernazard points to Com-
missioner Calzada as the root of many of the problems facing Do-
minican players.129 Bernazard claims that Calzada's unwillingness
to regulate the buscones simply perpetuates the exploitation of Do-
minican players.130 He explains that "[a]ll of these different
schemes they have in the Dominican Republic, they have access
because of the way the country is set up, you know these buscones,
that so-called Commissioner. He's a crook. He's on the take from
the buscones."131
7. CONCLUSION
True to its century-old mandate, baseball has "followed the
flag" in its globalization over the past twenty-five years.132 More
recently, the game's expansion has developed into a system that
calls for self-regulation and institutional reform on the part of
MLB.33 Additionally, MLB must pressure the Dominican Com-
missioner of Amateur Baseball to strictly enforce regulations
against the buscones. The combination of the ancillary effects of
MLB's current training program and the buscones' disingenuous re-
cruiting methods'34 currently results in a system with potential
long-term negative effects on Dominican boys.
However, baseball's role in Dominican society does not have to
be a "necessary evil" for the Dominican people. The sport can con-
tinue to seek talented players among the population without harm-
ful effects. MLB must act in conjunction with the Dominican gov-
ernment and follow through with recent discussions about how to
address harms that stem from the current recruiting system. 35
128 See id. (discussing the strength of the buscones as an organization).
129 Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 15; Roden, supra note 3, at 534.
133 See Telephone Interview with Lou Melbndez, supra note 29 (acknowledg-
ing MLB's influence on players' educational decisions and expressing his hopes
that a draft will help to implement change).
134 See Telephone Interview with Tony Bernazard, supra note 9 (accusing the
buscones of cheating players out of large percentages of their signing bonuses).
135 See Telephone Interview with Lou Mel(ndez, supra note 29 (stating that
MLB is currently working with development specialists in the D.R. to help pro-
mote better education for its recruits).
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While no one claims the business of baseball is the sole cause of the
social ills affecting the Dominican economy, the League is in a po-
sition to give back to the society that has produced some of the
greatest names in the game. Such steps will help to better compen-
sate players for the risks they take with MLB and will ensure a
positive working relationship between MLB and the people who
love the game.
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